INTRODUCTION
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19683 was enacted to assure the privacy of all oral and wire communications, and to define the circumstances under which interceptions of such conversations may be authorized. 4 Its sweeping prohibitions apply to "any person" who intercepts the conversations of others without permission, subjecting most instances of private wiretapping to civil and criminal penalties unless specifically excepted. Though Title III contains no general exceptions for domestic wiretapping, many courts have been unwilling to apply Title III's broad prohibitions to the home. The courts' unease with applying Title III to domestic wiretapping stems, in part, from the fact that private wiretapping often involves wiretapping between family members. 5 The most common cases involve a husband or wife tapping the telephone of a spouse (often recording all incoming and outgoing calls) in order to discover infidelities. 6 Many cases, however, involve parents intercepting the telephone conversations of their minor children. 7 The magnitude 5 "In the private sector, the most prevalent form of illegal eavesdropping occurs in the context of marital or family relations. This includes surveillance by one spouse on another, or between lovers, as well as surveillance of children by their parents." 6 See id. at 22. Although the Commission found that estimates were difficult because many incidents go unreported, "the major category of illegal eavesdropping appears by far to be marital spying, followed by parental, industrial, political, and illegal police spying." Id. The prevalence of domestic wiretapping has caused an "avalanche of cases arising out of marital disputes." CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 25.1, at 211 (Supp. 1992). Many of these cases involve rather bizarre situations. The facts of People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178 (Cal.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 414 (1992), are among the more intriguing-and disturbing-of the interspousal wiretapping cases: Joe Otto's distrust of his younger wife, Brenda Sue, bordered on the obsessive ....
To confirm his suspicions [of infidelity],Joe secretly taperecorded Brenda's telephone calls from the family residence. These recordings captured a conversation between Brenda and her suspected paramour which added a new and horrifying dimension toJoe's fears; the illicit alliance was a reality, but its object was not merely his wealth and marriage, it was his life itself.
Joe's concerns proved to be well founded. Within 48 hours of the recorded conversation, he was found dead-bludgeoned to death in his own home. Id. at 1179. Joe's creation of the incriminating tape recording was held to be a violation of Title III, the evidence was thrown out, and Brenda Sue's conviction for murder was reversed. See id. at 1195.
7 The issue has been presented to courts in numerous Title III cases, although few have addressed the issue directly. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 746 (10th Cir. 1992) (parent recording conversations between child and estranged spouse); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1535 (10th Cir. 1991) (wife recording exhusband's telephone conversation in which he instructed their two children to set fire to wife's home), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 678 (2d Cir. 1977) (parent recording conversations between child and of the problem is not insignificant. A survey of over 160,000 teenagers revealed that thirty-three percent of them thought their parents rarely respected their privacy, one of their major concerns being eavesdropping on telephone conversations. 8 In one extreme case, a family in Texas recorded the telephone conversations of their drug-abusing daughter almost continuously for six years, including a four year period of twenty-four hour surveillance. 9 Though such recordings are almost certainly violations of Title III,10 courts deciding both interspousal and parental wiretapping cases often refuse to apply Title III's clear prohibitions to "mere domestic conflicts," 1 1 citing a lack of congressional intent to extend Title III to the home. 12 Other courts refuse to create an exception to Title III for domestic wiretapping where Congress has mandated none. This division has been the focus of a nineteen year debate among federal and state judiciaries over the scope of Titie III's protection.
The dispute began in 1974 when the Fifth Circuit decided Simpson v. Simpson," 3 the first in a series of cases that held that Congress did not intend Title III to apply to interspousal wiretapping, 14 thus spawning the so-called "interspousal exception." In Simpson, a suspicious husband placed a recording device on a household telephone to intercept the "mildly compromising" conversations between his wife and another man. 15 interpretation of the language and legislative history of Title III and its creation of the interspousal exception. 22 These courts hold that the clear and unambiguous language of Title III prohibits all wiretaps except those specifically enumerated. Interspousal wiretapping is not so enumerated. 23 Although the recent trend among courts is firmly in favor of applying Title III's prohibitions to interspousal wiretapping, courts have been less eager to apply Title III to a second brand of domestic wiretapping-that by parents of their children's telephone conversations. For example, while one panel in the Tenth Circuit found itself "compelled first and foremost by the clear and unambiguous language of [Title III]" to reject the interspousal exception and the reasoning of Simpson in an interspousal wiretapping case, 2 4 another panel, in a decision handed down only a month earlier, refused to apply Title III to parental wiretapping, arguing that interspousal wiretapping is "qualitatively different from a custodial parent tapping a minor child's conversations within the family home." Only one commentator has suggested that Title III should not be applied to interspousal surveillance, arguing instead that, as the issue involves domestic relations doctrine, there is a "strong presumption" that state law should govern. See Cori D. Stephens What is the reason for this disparity? Title III proscribes the interception of telephone conversations by "any person" who does not fall under exceptions specifically provided for in the Act. 26 There is no explicit exception for parental wiretapping. 27 As one court has pointed out, "Title III is not ... an intrusion by the federal government into the law of domestic relations .... Title III regulates electronic eavesdropping, not marital relations." 28 Those who oppose applying Title III to parental wiretapping usually focus on a perceived intrusion by government into an area normally left private and open to parental discretion, namely, childrearing. In order to determine whether such an intrusion is justified, the law often mandates an inquiry into whether the "best interests" of a child will be served by governmental involvement. 29 Under this standard, the argument for exempting parental wiretapping from the prohibitions of Title III is persuasive only if one assumes that parents act in the best interests of their children when they eavesdrop on their conversations. An analogous argument was raised in support of the interspousal exception and subsequently rejected. s0 In fact, one could argue that allowing parental wiretap-
S.E.2d 548 (1991).

18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).
27 See id. § 2511(2)(a)-(h) (enumerating the exceptions to Title III). Some courts have argued, however, that § 2510(5)(a)(i), which excludes from the definition of "'electronic, mechanical, or other device [ 
2'
See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 30 It has been argued in interspousal wiretapping cases that the common law "unity of interest" doctrine exempts husbands and wives from liability under Title III because each spouse is assumed to be acting in the best interests of both. See Kepler, supra note 21, at 1212. The interspousal immunity doctrine to Title III,just as the interspousal exception itself, has been all but rejected in the past 10 years in the face of universal criticism. See, for example, M.G. v.J.C., 603 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991), where the court stated:
There is no reason whatsoever to allow spouses to perform non-consensual tortious acts against each other than there is to allow them to perform them against third parties. The right of privacy extends within the confines of the marital home. It is not somehow dissipated into the air upon the taking of marriage vows. Moreover since the instant case... aris[es] from a taping designed to "prove" marital infidelity, can it be seriously argued that a viable marital home or relationship exists. Rather, as is the norm in cases dealing with estranged spouses living under the same roof, the need for privacy is probably greater than under normal living conditions. A secretive taping ping is more harmful than regulating it. Indeed, in many situations governmental intrusion into the family may not merely be justified but required. 3 1 Moreover, it is not only the privacy of the person whose conversations are intercepted which is violated, but that of the person on the other end of the line as well.
3 2 As Justice Brandeis pointed out over sixty-five years ago:
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-
This Comment argues that Title III's broad prohibitions on wiretapping should be applied to all instances of domestic wiretapping. Inasmuch as parental and interspousal wiretapping are related analytically and combined jurisprudentially, the first half of this Comment will summarize the origins and criticisms of the interspousal exception and suggest that an exception allowing parental and other domestic wiretapping is equally flawed. Part I analyzes the language and legislative history of Title III, focusing on the "extension phone exception" and the issue of one-party consent. Part II addresses the treatment of Title III by the judiciary, from the of a spouse's calls under these conditions is an invasion in a most egregious fashion. relatively settled decisions on interspousal wiretapping to the incomplete and evolving jurisprudence of parental wiretapping. This Part will summarize the origins and criticisms of the interspousal exception in order to suggest how an exception for allowing parental and other domestic wiretapping is equally flawed. Finally, Part III addresses the theoretical justifications and strategies for applying (or not applying) Title III to children.
Id
I. TITLE III: THE WORDS AND THEIR PLAIN MEANING
Possibly the simplest aspect of the problem of parental wiretapping is presented by the language of Title III. Title III provides that:
( Title III allows such civil suits to be filed by "any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used."
5
This language led the Supreme Court to declare that "[t]he purpose of the legislation.., was effectively to prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions of oral and wire communications, except those specifically provided for in the Act." Although "[t]he major purpose of Title III is to combat organized crime," 7 the legislative history of Title III abounds with expressions which show that Congress intended to prohibit all m 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). Of the exceptions delineated in § 2511(2)(a)-(h), only subsection (d), which excepts interceptions which are authorized by one of the parties to the conversation, is arguably applicable to parental wiretapping. Some parents have argued that their children have impliedly authorized the interception of their conversations, or that parents, as guardians, can consent for children. This argument has not been fleshed out in the jurisprudence. See infra part III.
Title III also has an exclusionary rule: § 2515 prohibits the use of the contents of intercepted communications "in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any" federal, state, or other governmental body. Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. To assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, [T] itle III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers ....
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a
Virtually all concede that the use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance techniques by private unauthorized hands has little justification where communications are intercepted without the consent of one of the participants. One of the four congressional findings which accompanied the introduction of Title III into law read: "To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized [ manner as to allow even some slight degree of private wiretapping.
50
After twenty years of judicial interpretation of Title III, few courts are willing to argue that the legislative history supports the notion that Congress intended to exempt domestic wiretapping from the prohibitions of the Act. 51 With regard to parental wiretapping, the courts are therefore forced to rely on two exceptions to Title III to keep it out of the purview of Tide III: the extension phone exception, 5 2 and the one-party consent exception.
53
A. The Extension Phone (net Ordinary Course of Business) Exception
Perhaps the most common tool of household eavesdroppers is the extension phone. Its use can range from the harmlessly accidental (the phone rings and two people answer), to the outrageously purposeful (an extension phone is installed many miles from home where a voice-activated recorder tapes all incoming and outgoing calls). 54 While it is doubtful that the first type of eaves-' As the senators argued in the debates:
We have gone to every length which is proper, we think, to protect people's privacy. Today, individual privacy is being promiscuously invaded all over the country. The law is weak. The people who are against this title will talk about invasion of privacy but, privacy is being invaded today all the time. Now they are going a bit further. Today snoopers get hired to install tapes and electronic surveillance devices, and they are getting by with it because we cannot convict now under the present law; because we have to prove not only interception, but use.
This tightens the law on the invasion of privacy. That is the very first thing it does. That is one of its objectives, to correct present law, and at the same time not deny but permit, under the strictest regulation, court ordered supervision, and utilization of this technique for the investigation of crime. id. at 14,470 (statement of Sen. McClellan);
Not only must we be concerned about the civil liberties aspects of organized crime. Not only must we be concerned that those whom organized crime hurts most are those who most need society's protection. We must also be concerned about the indiscriminate use of electronic devices, which would be ended by title III. id. at 12,989 (statement of Sen. Tydings).
" See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 167-80 and accompanying text.
,2
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)X(5)(a)(i).
5' See § 2511(2)(d).
dropping can or should be regulated under Title III, it is likely that Title III prohibits the second.
Defining "Ordinary"
Title III defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any . . . communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
55 Section 2510(5) excludes from the definition of "electronic, mechanical, or other device ... any telephone... furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service ... and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business."
56 Because many parental and interspousal wiretapping cases involve eavesdropping over an extension phone, courts have been forced to grapple with whether an extension phone is an "electronic, mechanical, or other device," and thus whether the "ordinary course of business" encompasses the use of extension phones in the home. Indeed, courts have made this inquiry so frequently that § 2510(5)(a) has come to be referred to as the "Extension Phone Exception" rather than the "Ordinary Course of Business Exception," at least in domestic wiretapping cases.
57
At first blush, the extension phone exception does not seem to apply to domestic wiretapping.
Taken literally, the statute's reference to use "in [the] ordinary course of business" should only apply to commercial activity. transaction of business according to the common usages and customs of the commercial world generally or of the particular community or (in some cases) of the particular individual whose acts are under consideration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (6th ed. 1990). "Business" is generally considered commercial activity, although "[t]hat which habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labor, and effort of persons as a principal serious concern or interest" can also be one's business.
Id. at 198; see also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 185 (1991)
(stating that the seventh definition of "business" is "something with which a person is rightfully concerned," though the first six are commercial). One line of cases has applied this logic. In Brggs v. American Air Filter Co., the court noted that:
"no persuasive reason why Congress would exempt a business extension and not one in the home." 59 For those courts, that the extension phone exception applies in the home "is indicative of Congress's intention to abjure from deciding a very intimate question of familial relations." 6° This translates into the broader, yet flawed, conclusion that Title III does not apply to any domestic wiretapping.
61
Assuming that the exception for telephones used in the "ordinary course of business" embraces telephones used in the home, it is possible to see how what may be "ordinary" in a business setting is not "ordinary" at home, and vice versa. For example, one might expect calls to be systematically recorded in certain business or business-like situations (perhaps to enhance 911 emergency services or to ensure quality control in a telemarketing business); 62 in contrast, one would not expect calls to be monitored at random it is hard to see how use of an extension telephone to intercept a call involving non-business matters could be in the "ordinary course of business," since such activity is unlikely to further any legitimate business interest. However, interception of calls reasonably suspected to involve nonbusiness matters might be justified by an employer who had had difficulty controlling personal use of business equipment through warnings. 2 See e.g., Briggs, 630 F.2d at 420 (holding that the interception of a specific call based on specific fears of disclosure of confidential business information was not part of a systematic attempt to intercept calls, and was therefore made in the ordinary course of business).
for other, less business-related reasons.
63 A recent example of the latter situation involved the alleged monitoring of certain phone calls made at the State Department, leading to widespread questions of whether such eavesdropping is legal under Title 111 . 64 In the home, it probably would not surprise many people to learn that sometimes one or more of their telephone conversations are casually and unintentionally overheard over an extension phone by someone else. Such intrusions on privacy may be expected and unavoidable, and arguably unpunishable. 65 The interceptions are ordinary in the sense that they are often accidental. They simply do not fulfill the requirement in Title III that interceptions be intentional. 6 6 In the business setting, courts have held such "accidental" interceptions to be in the ordinary course of business, even when the eavesdropping lasted upwards of five minutes. 6'5 Even this basic statement may be untrue, however. Take, for example, a point made by ChiefJustice Warren in considering the nature of extension phones:
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension phone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. On the other hand, more systematic interceptions of telephone conversations via extension telephones raise the intrusion on privacy to another level of seriousness, 68 especially when the eavesdropper uses a tape recorder on a regular basis. This distinction makes intuitive sense. At the most practical level, a recording device is much more difficult to detect than a person listening in. The tape recorder, like an electronic wiretap, does not create noises, does not need sleep, and does not require a constant vigil by the phone.
69
A person who tapes a conversation, even through the simple means of turning on an answering machine, need not worry about carefully lifting the receiver in order to avoid detection. 70 On a more substantive level, the act of recording conversations is evidence of a more systematic and determined effort to invade the privacy of the intercepted parties. And while one may be able to characterize legal standard to specific facts," the holding of Axselle "absolutely contradicts the meaning of the operative language").
68 Indeed, at least in the business setting, courts are quite suspicious of systematic recording. See e.g., Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583 ("We hold that a personal call may not be intercepted in the ordinary course of business.., except to the extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use of the telephone or to determine whether a call is personal or not."); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 n.9 ("A general practice of surreptitious monitoring would be more intrusive on employees' privacy than monitoring limited to specific occasions.").
69 One commentator has explained the difference between systematic recording and individual instances of eavesdropping on extension phones:
There are two vital distinctions between an extension phone and a wiretap as they are used to intercept private conversations-the degree of human supervision and the potential product. Extension phone eavesdropping requires the presence of the eavesdropper, and therefore human frailties such as hunger and sleep are limiting factors. Also, as should be obvious, detection is a real problem to the eavesdropper who uses an extension phone. All of this necessarily affects the product that can be realistically derived from this type of surveillance. In contrast, a wiretap depends upon a minimum of human supervision. After installation, only periodic visits might be needed for maintenance, and this, as well as the technical sophistication of a wiretap, dramatically reduces the danger of detection. The product of such a tap, if desired, can reflect all the conversations that occur through the phone at all hours of the day. Therefore, extension phone eavesdropping has much less potential for violating the privacy of the targeted party, and, more importantly, the privacy of innocent third parties, than a wiretap. Holt, supra note 21, at 205-06. 70 Detectability has been quite important to courts in determining that recording devices are a clear violation of Title III. See e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Deal ordinarily would know (by the 'click' on the line) when the residential extension was picked up while she was using the store phone; thus her calls likely would not have been intercepted if the recorder had not been in place.").
the systematic recording of certain portions of conversations in the workplace as "ordinary," one would be hard pressed to justify as "ordinary" systematic recordings in the home. For example, in United States v. Harpel, 7 1 a case in which the defendant recorded calls via an extension phone, the court held "as a matter of law that a telephone extension used without authorization or consent to surreptitiously record a private telephone conversation is not used in the ordinary course of business. This conclusion comports with the basic purpose of the statute [and] 74 Briggs, for example, rejected the broad holding of Harpel, arguing that the constitutes the ordinary use of extension phones in a business setting could lead to exactly the opposite conclusion to that of ordinary use in the home. For this reason, an ad hoc determination of whether the use of an extension telephone in a particular case was ordinary would seem to be required before one could determine whether Title II had been violated. Nonetheless, courts have been much more conscientious in applying a rigorous "ordinary use" analysis on a case-by-case basis to commercial wiretapping than to domestic wiretapping. 7 Indeed, courts applying Title III in the business setting have been quite discriminating in observing the differences between personal and business calls, and they have arrived at different outcomes on the basis of express or implied consent to monitor calls, the nature and extent of the invasion, and whether the interception of a specific call was in the ordinary course of business, regardless of a general policy to monitor telephones. 76 Such scrutiny has not been applied to domestic wiretapping. This could be due, in part, to the fact that courts are accustomed to applying the "Extension Phone Exception" as opposed to the "Ordinary Course of Business Exception." 77 The use of this shorthand reference may lead courts to pass over an analysis of whether a specific interception in the home was ordinary, relying instead on a factual determination of whether the phone was an extension. Indeed, courts regularly use a standard in the business setting which analyzes how ordinary the eavesdropping was, 78 while rejecting the same approach in considering the home. 323 (C.M.A. 1982) . 79 In the realm of domestic wiretapping, courts generally have not analyzed specific instances of interceptions to determine if they were ordinary, but instead have relied on the general assumption that there is an exception for extension telephones used in the home, even when a recording device is attached to the extension phone. Beyond its origins as a simple nickname, this approach, though inconsistent and illogical, seems to stem from a rather isolated statement made during the legislative hearings on Title III.
Professor Herman Schwartz, one witness at a 1967 House of Representatives hearing on the problem of wiretapping, has been cited in many cases 80 as saying, "I take it nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter or some such related problem. I do not know." 81 defining "interception" as always excluding use of an extension phone, the following situations are also excluded from regulation:
(1) an eavesdropper breaks in, hides in one part of the house or office without the knowledge of anyone else, and listens in on an extension; (2) the police or someone else coerce someone into letting them listen in on an extension phone; (3) the police or someone else obtain authority to listen in on an extension phone by someone not a party to the conversation and who has no authority of any kind to allow them to do so. Surely, eavesdropping should be allowed in one of these cases, but because of the blanket exemption for extension phones, they are completely exempt from regulation. We would therefore recommend deletion of [the exception] or at least some kind of redefinition limiting it to the specific types of cases the draftsmen had in mind.
86
As his statement shows, Professor Schwartz's concern was not that the use of extension phones to eavesdrop would be made illegal, but that it would exempt too many situations he considered objectionable. The draftsmen apparently took heed of his concerns, because they added the "ordinary course of... business" language to qualify the exception, and removed the explicit reference to extension telephones. 87 Rather than implying that Congress ought to ignore the situation involving parental tapping of children's phones, Professor Schwartz's statement implicitly calls for an evaluation of each situation-be it in the commercial or domestic setting-to determine the desirability of allowing an exception to the general prohibitions of Title III. Only in this way does the ordinary course of business exception make sense.
Getting Down to Business
Requiring courts to apply the ordinary course of business exception evenly in both commercial and domestic wiretapping cases is neither an impossible nor unprincipled approach to statutory construction, nor does it place an unreasonable strain on 95 Id. at 351. 9 One court has implicitly adopted this analysis, holdingWe have been unable to divine any reason for an "extension telephone" exception. The purpose of the statute is to prohibit the secret monitoring of wire communications. Its application should not turn on the type of equipment that is used, but whether the privacy of telephone conversations has been invaded in a manner offensive to the words and intent of the Act. 
1993]
directly by defining "oral communication" as a communication "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 9 7 Title III's definition of "wire communication," by contrast, contains no such requirement. 98 Although some courts have used this difference to reject any reference to reasonable expectations of privacy, 99 the Supreme Court's analysis is instructive for, if not dispositive of, an ad hoc analysis of the ordinary course of business exception. This is not to say that the Katz analysis should be substituted for an ordinary course of business analysis. To do so would be, in the words of one court, to "put[] the cart before the horse," 100 as an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is only enforceable if federal law makes the interception illegal.
1 1 Assuming that an individual pursuing a Title III action has no other basis under federal law for having an expectation of privacy, that individual will first have to show that the interception was not in the ordinary course of business. Nonetheless, as the Briggs court observes, noting that the "ordinary course of business" determination is logically prior to the conclusion that federal law creates an enforceable expectation of privacy... by no means... suggest[s] that the same common experience and behavior which help define our expectations are irrelevant to the "ordinary course of business" issue. If the common experience in this country is that under certain circumstances, communications made on office Reliance on the "normal use" exception of § 2510(5)(a)(i) to allow an eavesdropper to use an extension telephone... reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose of Title III and a failure to strictly construe its regulatory structure. The tendency to accept an "extension phone" exemption to the statute's prohibition of all forms and modes of electronic eavesdropping would, if implemented, leave the most common means of listening to another's conversations completely unregulated. Instead of embracing the extension phone exemption, courts should carefully distinguish between a use which may be justifiably viewed as normal (i.e., an anxious parent's understandable overhearing of a drug abusing child's conversations), and those which cannot so easily be accepted and tolerated in a society which values and seeks to protect conversational privacy.
Id. § 3.6, at 3-110.2 to 3-110.3 (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
98 See § 2510(1). telephones are not listened to by employers or their agents, it could not be said that an act of listening to such a conversation is in the "ordinary course of business."
10 2
An application of Title III which turns solely on the use of particular equipment installed in a particular location (namely an extension phone), without taking into account the circumstances in which the interception takes place, is, by this analysis, misplaced. A preferable approach would be to factor in expectations of privacy by rigorous application of the ordinary course of business test in both commercial and domestic wiretapping cases. 103 This approach is much more beneficial than an across the board validation of extension phone interceptions, especially in the home, as each individual's situation can be analyzed separately. More importantly, a flexible standard which factors in expectations of privacy allows courts to determine whether particular methods of interception are prohibited by Title III. Take, for example, the case of a child who has a known drug problem, the archetypical case from whence a justification for parental supervision could spring.
1 0 4 If the parent takes an active role in ensuring that her child is free from drugs, say by enforcing a curfew, taking the child to counseling, and looking for obvious signs of drug use, then the child can expect her parent to monitor her calls to a degree to ensure her safety. In this situation, monitoring could very well be considered to be in the ordinary course of business. 1 0 5 On the other hand, four years of twenty-four hour-a-day surveillance would probably be unreasonable to expect. 10 6 A flexible, Katz-like analysis of instances of parental wiretapping would provide a much greater degree of privacy than is currently afforded in the home, 102 Id. at 417-18. 103 This view comports with the wishes of Professor Blake', the drafter of Title IIl. When asked whether the framers of Title III intended the extension phone exception to apply to the home, Professor Blakey said "It absolutely applies to the home. I wish we had used a different word than 'business' so it wouldn't be limited to commercial phones." Telephone Interview with G. Robert Blake', Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 16, 1992) . 104 10 7 is an excellent example.
In Watkins, the employer had a general policy of monitoring sales calls via a normal extension phone. The employees were told that they could make personal calls which the supervisor would monitor only as long as necessary to determine that the calls were not business-related. 0 8 During lunch one day, Watkins, an employee of L.M. Berry, received a call from a friend who asked her about a job interview she had had the previous evening with another company. 1°9 The call was monitored, and as a result, Watkins was fired the next day.
110
The Eleventh Circuit argued that to prevail under the ordinary course of business exception, an employer must show that the interception of the call beyond the initial period was in the ordinary course of business. It is not enough for the Berry Co. to claim that its general policy is justifiable as part of the ordinary course of business. We have no doubt that it is. The question before us, rather, is whether the interception of this call was in the ordinary course of business.
111
The court held that the answer to the question was a triable issue of fact, and remanded to the district court.
1 2 A similar type of percall analysis should be applied across the spectrum of private wiretapping. In light of the relative clarity and uniformity of decisions which apply the ordinary course of business exception in the business setting, it seems strange that domestic wiretapping decisions have thus far failed to follow the same path. Our case is a simple one; we deal here only with a fundamental and cherished human right, that of privacy. The enjoyment of that right has been seriously imperiled by modern technology, prompting Congress to enact Title III as a barrier to further encroachment on such enjoyment. Since the right of privacy has been afforded federal statutory protection, there is nojustification for a federal court, presented with an "interspousal" Title III suit, to dismiss that suit by stating that it involves only a "domestic conflict." Id.
Notwithstanding most courts' squeamishness, a recent Supreme Court decision may reflect a trend among courts to loosen the strictures of the domestic relations exception and pave the way for increased federal involvement in domestic disputes. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (1992), the Court reaffirmed the domestic relations exception to federal diversityjurisdiction on the basis of a century situations despite the lack of support for such a distinction in Title III.
B. The Issue of One-Party Consent
Another issue raised in parental wiretapping cases is Title III's exception for consensual interceptions. Section 2511(2)(d) exempts from liability any person who intercepts a communication "where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." 116 In most situations, determining whether consent has been given is rather straightforward: either it has or it has not. In situations involving children, however, determining the existence of consent can be more difficult, as a parent may be able to consent on behalf of the child if the parent is acting in the child's "best interests."
Although courts interpreting the exception have read "consent" rather broadly, exempting consensual interceptions made for almost any reason, 117 the legislative history of § 2511(2)(d) suggests a narrower exception. Senator Hart, sponsor of the one-party consent exception, proposed "to prohibit a one-party consent tap, except for law enforcement officials, and for private persons who act in a defensive fashion." 118 Senator Hart gave the situation in which "the party acts out of a legitimate desire to protect himself and his own conversations from later distortions or other unlawful or injurious uses by the other party" 11 9 as an example of a legitimate consensual tap.
Despite this legislative history, some parents have argued that their interception of their children's conversations does not violate Title III, noting that because wiretapping was in the children's "best interest," the children constructively consented to it. this argument has not been fully explored by the courts, 121 it is clear that the issue will have to be addressed.
The issue of consent is not unique to parental wiretapping cases. 122 Besides cases involving informants in the context of law enforcement, 123 the consent exception is raised most frequently in the business setting, where it is argued that employees consent to monitoring and recording through actual or implied consent.
124
As in the debate over extension phones, the issue of consent has been much more rigorously addressed this setting than in the home, and indeed, courts have held businesses to a rather strict standard of consent. 125 The cases cited supra note 120 were decided on the grounds that Title III does not apply to domestic wiretapping at all; therefore, they did not reach the issue of whether the child impliedly consented to the tapping.
122 The issues surrounding a child's capacity to consent and whether a parent can consent for his or her child come up in many areas of the law, including medical care, child custody hearings, delinquency proceedings, and education. place .... It would thwart this policy if consent could routinely be implied from circumstances.
127
Courts have limited findings of implied consent in the business setting to very narrow circumstances, where it was abundantly clear that the victim of the interception should have known that the phone was being monitored.
128
The same is not true of the application of the consent exception to parental wiretapping.
Arguing that children consent to having their conversations intercepted implies that children not only can, but wish to give up their right to privacy to the interests of their parents. In a generally harmonious family, such presumptions may have their place. 129 Indeed, in the present state of the law, analyses of the "best interests" of the child begin from this presumption:
In the eyes of the law, to be a child is to be at risk, dependent, and without capacity or authority to decide free of parental control what is "best" for oneself. To be an adult is in law perceived as free to take risks, with the independent capacity and authority to decide what is "best" for oneself and without regard to parental wishes. To be an adult who is a parent is therefore to be presumed by law to have the capacity, authority, and responsibility 129 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrIONAL LAw 1590 n.8 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that "routine cases of parental discipline in an essentially successful family whose continuation is mutually desired will properly be treated as raising no real constitutional issue," but will raise an issue if the family is in disarray). Others argue that even in an intact family, conflicts of interest can undermine the justification for "substituting" the judgment of the parent for that of the child:
The concept of substituted judgment [in which an adult provides a kind of proxy consent] presumes a great deal. Most notably, it assumes that the person making the decision is willing and able to act in this capacity on the child's best interests (i.e., without a conflict of interests). Even within the loving, intact, two-parent family, not all parental decisions regarding children are without conflicts of interest. Parents often subordinate their needs and preferences to the best interests of their children (or to what they believe to be their children's best interests), but this is not always the case. The justification for allowing the state to intervene in the home and usurp parental autonomy to enforce a clearly defined public policy is at its strongest in this situation, 5 5 suggesting that courts should require proof of adherence to Title III's procedural requirements in all situations. This would require determining whether or not the child "consented" to interception in the first place.
The attempt to arrive at such a determination could be a journey into the ridiculous. If courts applied the standard they use to decide business cases to parental wiretapping, parents might be asked to show that their child was informed, in writing, that her calls were being monitored, and that the child knew or should have known that specific personal calls were overheard. Furthermore, it is doubtful that a finding of consent would have any meaning given the unequal balance of authority between children and their parents.'
36
To top it off, sociologists and psychologists have 135 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit argue, for example, that there are two distinct responses to the question, "What shouldjustify substituting the state's judgment for that of parents with regard to the care of a particular child?" The first has been to set relatively precise limits on parental judgment concerning matters about which there is a clear societal consensus. For example, parents are not free to send their children into the labor market or to refuse to let them attend school or be immunized against certain contagious diseases. Legislative enactments like those concerned with child labor, compulsory education, and immunization are infringements upon parental autonomy which give parents fair warning of what constitutes a breach of their child care responsibilities and provide advance notice of the extent of the state's power to intervene. In thus defining the authority to intrude in precise terms, legislatures also restrict the power of administrative agencies and courts to breach the state's general commitment to family privacy and parental autonomy. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 130, at 15-16 (footnote omitted). The second response, which is the focus of the book, requires judges and state agencies to act as "pare= patriae with almost limitless discretion in areas generally under the exclusive control of parents." Id. at 17. Subjects of the second response include child neglect, custody disputes, and situations involving placement of the child away from parents.
An example of a situation where child/parent conflict may provide ajustification for usurping parental authority is in the debate over abortions for minors. When a parent refuses to give permission to allow a minor child to have an abortion, the parent and child are deemed to be in such a "fundamental[ ] ... conflict" that notions of "safeguarding... the family unit and of parental authority" are unlikely to be persuasive. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). Although the wiretapping issue may not rise to the fundamental level presented by abortion, conflicts over privacy may have profound effects on the family relationship and on parental control. This could lead to problems far greater than those claimed tojustify the original eavesdropping.
136 A child can do little but agree to consent as required by their parent, due to the "inherent inequality between adult and child." GOLDSTEIN ETAL.,supra note 130, at 13 & n.17. "Consent" in this sense is not meaningful in terms of ensuring that the expressed concern about children's capacity to consent where the child is forced to assume a decision-making role. 13 7 Alternatively, one could argue that the consent standard as applied through Title III to children does not really require a finding of "consent" in the strict sense of the word. There is a substantive difference between the demands made on children in the "hard cases" and those made on children in the Title III sense. Decisions concerning abortion, medical treatment, juvenile delinquency, educational choices, and other "hard cases," require children to act as though they were adults in deciding how to order their lives.
13 8 The consent requirement of Title III does not require such highly developed decision-making skills-it is perhaps better thought of as a notice requirement which demands that children be informed of the wiretapping and understand the effect the wiretap will have on their privacy. 3 9 In dealing with adult child understands what they are giving up. It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today. The child may decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel. It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of their own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed. The child, therefore, should be given an opportunity to be heard before the State gives the exemption which we honor today.
Id. at 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
139 Koocher suggests that it may be more appropriate to give children the power to "assent," or the power to veto, rather than the power to "consent," which implies a "reasoned and voluntary acquiescence." Koocher, supra note 129, at 13. He argues victims of wiretapping, who have an individual capacity to grant or withhold consent to monitoring, the strict requirement of consent makes sense as a formal way of ensuring notice. For children in the home, however, formal notice requirements are impractable. Instead, the law might require the presence of conditions we associate with the "spirit" of consent.
At least one sociologist who studies the issue of children's capacity to consent has noted that research analyzing the management of access to children's private space "tells us something about day-to-day parent-child relations and also has some legal rele- 143 In sociological terms, the reasonable expectations of privacy and capacity to consent have been described as the existence and degree of a child's "control/choice" in the family. 144 Control/choice is a variable element in a system of privacy which consists of two elements: privacy as interaction management, involving choices about how, where, and when to interact with others; and (more importantly for purposes of Title III) privacy as information management, which "relates to the individual's desire to manage past and present information about him/herself." 45 Not surprisingly, the degree of control/choice we expect and need increases as we grow, rising from a complete lack of control/choice as infants (where adults control our interactions) to a high level of control choice as adolescents and young adults. 146 negatively affected when her degree of control/choice in managing information lags behind her increasing need for it. 147 As applied to Title III, the control/choice indicators reflect the serious need for some form of consent to invasions of privacy, while at the same time suggesting a reasonable level of consent required in different situations by different children. At the same time, the control/choice standard requires much less than a strict finding of "consent." This provides a flexibility that is similar to the reasonable expectation of privacy standard as applied to the ordinary course of business. Indeed, it would seem that the ordinary course of business standard and the consent requirement are linked by this commonality. 148 In order to conform to the spirit of Title III, which regards nearly all instances of nonconsensual wiretapping illegal, parents simply need to ensure that their children understand that their phone conversations can or will be monitored or recorded. 149 This requirement may very well ruin parents' surreptitious attempts to catch their children doing what their parents do not want them to do; yet informing children of the possibility that they will be caught may be more effective at stopping those "wrongful" actions than surreptitiously invading their privacy, and implicitly, their trust.
II. THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC WIRETAPPING
AT A CROSSROADS
The debate among the courts as to whether Title III applies to domestic wiretapping has been characterized by a rather large philosophical split. Although the judicial history of interspousal wiretapping has been well documented over the past fifteen to twenty years, 150 with the balance of decisions firmly in favor of holding Title III applicable to interspousal wiretapping, the courts 147 See id. at 215. "Children's and adolescents' descriptions of information management experiences involve the attempts of others to lessen their autonomy, i.e., experiences with the loss of control over information which have negative conse- of cases which follow Simpson and of cases which involve parental wiretapping. 160 The defendant in Anonymous used the record feature of an answering machine to intercept and record conversations between his ex-wife and their daughter. 161 Adopting the reasoning and statutory analysis of Simpson, the Anonymous court held that "[tihe facts ... present a purely domestic conflict-a dispute between a wife and her ex-husband over the custody of their children-a matter clearly to be handled by the state courts."
162
Anonymous also relied on the extension phone exception: "[W]e, like Professor Schwartz, assume that 'nobody wants to make it a crime' for a father to listen in on conversations between his wife and his eight year old daughter, from his own phone, in his own home." 163 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the father both recorded the conversations 1 64 and was under a court order to leave the room when his daughter was speaking to her mother on the telephone. 165 The Anonymous court did, however, narrow the holding in Simpson somewhat by distinguishing the situation at hand from one where all incoming and outgoing calls are recorded, thereby "invad[ing] the privacy of innumerable persons, known and unknown." . 1988) . It is interesting to note that theJanecka court came "exceedingly close" to imposing Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs, but did not because "plaintiffs may have sincerely believed that the Court would seek to limit the scope of Anonymous." Id. at 27. Janecka was decided in the Second Circuit; therefore, the court was bound by the decision in Anonymous. Heggy is typical of cases which follow United States v. Jones. Tom Heggy placed a voice-activated tape recorder on an extension telephone located in a barn next to his home in order to record the conversations of his wife whom he was in the process of divorcing. 183 The court felt it was "compelled first and foremost by the clear and unambiguous language of the statute" to conclude that Title III applies to interspousal wiretapping. 184 Referring to Title III's prohibition on the interception of communications "by any person except as specifically provided in the statute," the court found 176 Id. 177 d. 178 Id. at 469-70 (citation to Lewis Carroll omitted). 179 In the remaining pages, the words "untenable," "misread," "illogical," "backhanded," and "vague," among others, were used to describe Judge Bell's opinion. Id. passim. 180 See id. at 476. Judge Lord also summarily rejected reliance on Mildred's expectation of privacy, the existence of an extension phone exception, the applicability of the doctrine of interspousal immunity, Lowell's assertions that Title III was not a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause or that it violated Due Process, and the applicability of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. See id. at 472-76. 181 
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will have different outcomes based solely on their relationship with the party intercepting the conversation.
2°°
A more principled approach to the problem would have involved an analysis of whether the ordinary course of business exception applied to the circumstances in Newcomb. To use the court's own terminology, there is no persuasive reason to distinguish between the use of extension phones in businesses and in the home.
Evidently, only one court has pursued the "ordinary course of business" analysis in a parental wiretapping situation. In State v. Shaw, 20 1 a North Carolina court considered a case in which a mother recorded the conversation of her son and "another young man," Shaw, over an extension phone. 20 2 The tape, which the mother turned over to police, disclosed plans on the part of the men to buy some "shrooms" (psychedelic mushrooms The court concluded "that the activity by the mother is prohibited by Title III, which states that any exceptions to its prohibitions are 'specifically provided for in this chapter. ' What we have, to this point, is a relatively clear statute that is broad enough to encompass parental wiretapping; an interpretation of the exceptions to that statute which allows enough flexibility to fit the vagaries of children's needs while maintaining a sufficient degree of rigor; and a case history which leaves open the possibility of further judicial action. What is still needed is ajustification and strategy for action.
III. THE JUSTIFICATION AND STRATEGY FOR APPLYING TITLE III TO PARENTAL WIRETAPPING
The relationship between parent and child is one which requires particular delicacy. 210 It, even more than the relationship be- The Act is a far-reaching one which, if read to cover circumstances such as that presented by the instant case, would have serious ramifications as to the degree of federal control over actions by family members within their own homes. Absent a signal, either in the statute itself or in the legislative history, that Congress intended that the Act's criminal and civil proscriptions and liabilities to extend to a decision by a spouse to record conversations on his own residence's telephone, this Court must decline to impute such an intent. Id. at 533.
The Lizza court's concern is common to courts considering issues of familial wiretapping. See also United States v.Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1976) ("We reach this conclusion [that interspousal wiretapping is prohibited by Title III] reluctantly because we share the concern of other courts which have grappled with this problem that application of federal wiretap law to essentially domestic conflicts may lead to harsh results in individual cases.").
210 See Rodham, supra note 131, at 487 ("The[] issues of family autonomy and privacy, state responsibility, and children's independence are complex, but they determine how children are treated by the nation's legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies.").
tween husband and wife, is the basic element of society. A primary concern of the law, then, must be to protect the proper functioning of that relationship. In doing so, the law often dictates how some of the most intimate social relationships are ordered. From the moment of birth the law steps in to ensure that the child's "best interests" are being served.
211 Not everyone is comfortable with the extensive and increasing role of the law in family life, but for very different reasons. On one side, traditionalists argue that the quasi-constitutional rights of parental autonomy and familial privacy are degraded when the government intrudes on the parent-child relationship. On the other side, children's rights advocates insist that children can and should decide what is best for themselves. Somewhere in between lies the justification for granting or denying children the statutory protection of Title 111.212 It is generally accepted that a lack of privacy is detrimental to the development of children. The degree of state intervention on the private ordering of the parent-child relationship ranges from a minimum-automatic assignment of a child by birth certificate to his biological parents-to a maximum-court-ordered removal of a child from his custodians because he is found to be "neglected" or "delinquent" or they are "unfit" to be parents. The traditional goal of such interventions is to serve "the best interests of the child."
Id.
212 It seems obvious that those who favor the children's rights viewpoint would support the extension of Title III's protections to children. The corollary assumption is that those who favor parental autonomy would oppose the application of Title III to children on the theory that it would interfere with domestic relations. It should be stressed, however, that although this section focuses on the constitutional and quasi-constitutional bases for applying Title III, Title III itself does not rest on constitutional principles beyond the simple application of the Commerce Clause power to the use of telephones in interstate commerce. The "rights" conferred by Title III can therefore be applied independently of this analysis, though the justification for applying it may depend on a particular court's philosophical stance.
213 In summarizing research by psychologists on the effects of privacy on children, one book noted that access to privacy for children was generally found to be connected to self esteem, the production of positive social behavior, and allowing the child to separate from others in order to individuate and become more self-reliant. justified, can be detrimental to a child's development. 214 Historically, one way the law sought to protect the privacy of familial relations was to deny causes of action by one family member against another through the doctrines of interspousal and parental immunity. 215 The major justification for both types of immunity is that it "promotes family harmony" by encouraging the private settlement of familial disputes. Like the interspousal immunity doctrine, however, which has been abrogated in a majority of states, 2 16 parental immunity is generally a doctrine of the past. 2 17 There are at least two explanations for this. First, denying access to courts does not necessarily promote family harmony. Indeed, in the case of wiretapping it is hard to see how family harmony is served by allowing family members to tap each other's phones. 218 Second, the parental immunity doctrine has fallen 214 For example, Goldstein, in the context of state decisions regarding the placement of children, advocates a policy of "minimum state intervention" in the home. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 130, at 4. Goldstein argues that the complex and vital developments [during childhood] require the privacy of family life under guardianship by parents who are autonomous. The younger the child, the greater is his need for them. When family integrity is broken or weakened by state intrusion, his needs are thwarted and his belief that his parents are omniscient and all-powerful is shaken prematurely. The effect on the child's developmental process is invariably detrimental.
Id. at 9. Nonetheless, Goldstein does acknowledge that state intervention is required in some cases:
Family privacy may become a cover for exploiting the inherent inequality between adult and child. It may prevent detection of the uncontrolled expression of both unconscious and conscious hatred some parents have for their children. Family privacy ceases to benefit the child and becomes a threat to his well-being, to his safety, and occasionally to his life. Those dangers justify state intervention. Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
215 See Rowe, supra note 21, at 863-67 (providing an historical overview of the common law and present day interspousal immunity doctrine The policy of marital harmony is not furthered by permitting one covertly to invade the privacy of his or her spouse without fear of civil reprisal. It is undisputed that spying and prying by one spouse into the private telephone conversations of the other does not contribute to domestic tranquility or assist in preserving the marital estate. Eavesdropping, by nature, undermines the faith and trust upon which the institution of victim to an increasing recognition of children's rights. Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has effectively eradicated the notion that children have no rights under the Constitution. 2 19 In that same period, however, the quasi-constitutional rights to parental autonomy and freedom from state intrusion into the family have been increasing. 220 As Goldstein points out, 2 21 the Supreme Court has recognized "the integrity of [family] life [a]s something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right." 22 2 When the children's rights and marriage is founded. A rule of law which leaves such repugnant behavior unsanctioned can hardly be said to preserve the marital unit. Id. at 222-23; State v.Jock, 404 A.2d 518, 520 (Del. 1979) ("To recognize interspousal immunity in this context would reward the surreptitious spouse while according the privacy of the targeted spouse less protection than is provided for suspected criminals."). Though the courts in these cases were referring to the protection for interspousal wiretapping, their analysis is no less applicable to parental wiretapping. The rights to parental autonomy and familial integrity are also supported by child psychologists. See e.g., GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 130, at 9-10 (discussing the importance of family integrity as it relates to child placement decisions by the state). Goldstein argues that family integrity consists of three elements: parental autonomy, a child's rights to autonomous parents, and privacy. See id. Preserving family integrity serves two purposes:
The first is to provide parents with the opportunity to meet the developing physical and emotional needs of their child so as to establish the familial bonds critical to every child's healthy growth and development. The second purpose, and the one on which the parental right must ultimately rest, is to safeguard the continuing maintenance of these family ties-of psychological parent-child relationships-once they have been established.
221 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 130, at 9. 222 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also parental rights clash, as in Bellotti v. Baird, 22 3 which pitted the constitutional right of minors to obtain an abortion against the quasi-constitutional rights of parental autonomy and family integrity, the issues become quite complex. 22 4 It is not clear that it is possible or even desirable to raise the competing interests involved in parental wiretapping to this level of constitutional importance. One way to avoid creating a constitutional debate over applying Title III to children is to couch the competing interests in terms of more traditional individual rights, rather than attempting to constitutionalize a right to familial autonomy in the context of wiretapping. Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, suggests that "family integrity" is simply a catch-all phrase describing a conglomeration of individual rights, and that, taken together, decisions concerning families and those concerning the individuals that make up families cancel each other out. 225 observing which child-rearing strategies have won the Justices' respect," namely, only those in which "parents succeed (as the Court found that 'the Amish succeed') in bringing obedient social conformance from their children." 2 28 This theory may imply that the failure of Brent Newcomb's mother to keep her child from trying to burn down her home 229 should bar her, theoretically at least, from exemption under Title III. A more principled way to address the Title III situation, however, would be to argue from a positive notion of children's rights under the statute, as suggested by various children's advocates.
A positive formulation of children's rights can be achieved at many different levels of generality. The most extreme, often associated with Hillary Rodham Clinton's early writings, 230 
